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Pluralism, Private Schools and Public Policy 
E. Vance Randall* 
At present opinion is divided about the subjects of education. 
All do not take the same view about what should be learned 
by the young, either with a view to plain goodness or with a 
view to the best life possible . . . Goodness itself, to begin 
with, has not the same meaning for all the different people 
who honour it ... it is hardly surprising there should also be 
difference about the right methods of practising goodness. 
-Aristotle1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By the end of November in 1965, all of Iowa and most of 
the nation had learned of the confrontation between the 
Amish-or Plain People-and the local officials in rural 
Buchanan County. Media accounts, complete with pictures and 
commentary, recounted the efforts of the school superintendent, 
the sheriff, and the county attorney to bring children attending 
unapproved Amish schools to the local public school. The scenes 
were pregnant with emotion. Some children ran for the cover of 
the cornfield at the approach of the local authorities while 
others began sobbing as they huddled in the corner of the 
schoolhouse. Weeping mothers embraced their youngsters, and 
the superintendent kept trying to loosen the grip of a crying 
boy from his desk. Many of the Amish people were arrested 
and ordered to pay fines. When their personal funds were 
exhausted, much of their property was auctioned off by local 
officials to pay for the assessments levied against them. 2 
* Assistant Professor of Educational Leadership, Brigham Young University, 
B.S. Brigham Young University, 1975; M.Ed. Brigham Young University, 1978; 
Ph.D. Cornell University, 1989. 
© Reprinted by permission of Teachers College Press. Before making copies, contact 
Teachers College Press for permission at 1234 Amsterdam Ave., New York, NY 
10027. 
1. THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 333-334 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., 1981). 
2. Donald A. Erickson, Showdown at an Amish Schoolhouse: A Description 
35 
... 
.i.. 
- ~ 
> 
., .. 
: .. ) 
,, IJ 
J 
~ 
'I ); ,... 
36 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1994 
During the early morning hours of October 18, 1982, 
fifteen carloads of deputies and state troopers under the 
direction of the sheriff arrived at the Faith Baptist Church in 
Louisville, Nebraska. They had a court order to secure the 
building with padlocks to prevent its continued use as the site 
of an unapproved school. The doors were to be opened only 
during worship hours. Inside were some 85 persons conducting 
a "prayer vigil" in behalf of their pastor, Reverend Mr. Everett 
Sileven, who had been jailed for operating an unapproved 
school. When the worshippers refused to leave, they were 
carried out by the law enforcement officials and the building 
was padlocked. Earlier, the pastor had asked God to convert or 
exterminate the civil authorities of Nebraska. A law 
enforcement officer had suggested the use of incendiary 
grenades as one means to compel compliance with the law. 
Numerous arrests were made and the tensions were not 
reduced until the governor and state legislature intervened.3 
To the credit of both sides, a compromise was eventually 
reached which allowed private schools sponsored by religious 
organizations to be approved by the state using less stringent 
criteria.4 
A. Historical Overview 
The degree of state intervention in the educational process-
es of the public schools has always been problematic. It be-
comes even more so when the school is not an agency of the 
state but a private endeavor. "Few issues," notes Ravitch, "have 
been as tortuous for our political system as trying to define the 
appropriate relation between the state and nonpublic schools."5 
A high degree of state intervention which prescribes the scope 
and nature of private schools runs the risk of eliminating cul-
tural diversity, innovative educational practices and experimen-
tation. Extensive and intrusive state regulation, while well-
and Analysis of the Iowa Controversy, in PuBLIC CONTROLS FOR NONPUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 15-59 (Donald A. Erickson ed., 1969). 
One state supreme court justice characterized these actions by public officials 
as "gestapo tactics." State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539, 550 (Wis. 1971), cert. granted 
402 U.S. 994, aff'd 406 U.S. 205 (1972), (Heffernan, J., dissenting). 
3. Patricia Lines, The New Private Schools and Their Historic Purpose, PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN, January 1986, at 377; McCurry v. Tesch, 738 F.2d 271, 273 (1984), 
cert. denied 469 U.S. 1211, reh'g. denied 471 U.S. 1049 (1985). 
4. NEB. REV. STAT. §79-1701 (Supp. 1986). 
5. DIANE RAVITCH, THE SCHOOLS WE DESERVE 162 (1985). 
-
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meaning, could severely damage the institutional integrity and 
mission of private schools by transforming them into privately 
financed public schools. Educational pluralism, a hallmark of 
democracy, with its expansive allowance for different 
worldviews, values, beliefs, ideas, lifestyles and practices could 
be significantly diminished by state regulations mandating a 
greater degree of homogeneity in education. The dilemma of 
determining what appropriate relationship ought to exist be-
tween private schools and the state is complicated further by 
the prominent position of private schools in American educa-
tion since the colonial era. Until the creation of public or gov-
ernment schools during the middle of the nineteenth century, 
private sources-churches, communities, apprenticeships, tu-
tors, independent schools and families-performed the crucial 
task of passing on a way of life to the next generation. The 
establishment of state supported schools signaled a fundamen-
tal and radical change in the relationship between the state 
and the individual, the family, the community, and the 
church.6 
While the benefits bestowed by the formation of state con-
trolled schools should not be depreciated by private school 
advocates, neither should the problems or dilemmas created by 
the presence of government schools for our democratic republic 
be minimized by public school partisans. One of the key ques-
tions revolves around participation by private educational insti-
tutions in a society where a state sanctioned and supported 
school system is ideologically linked to the preservation and 
progress of the nation. One implication suggested by the estab-
lishment of a government school system and this ideological 
connection is the existence of some sort of majoritarian ortho-
doxy with respect to values, attitudes and behavior. How do the 
various minority groups and subcultures in America with their 
own sense of truth and reality fit into American society? How 
can they transmit these particular worldviews to their chil-
dren? These questions become especially troublesome in light of 
our inability to arrive at a consensus on what constitutes a 
common curriculum, proper pedagogical procedures, and essen-
tial educational goals. They touch the core of our society by 
asking which values should be embraced by all and who should 
select them. 7 Furthermore, where is the line to be drawn be-
6. David Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory 
Schooling, 46 HARV. Eouc. REV. 355-388 (1976). 
7. RAVITCH, supra note 5; Paul Damsen, How Not To Fix The Schools, 272 
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tween individual liberty and state interest, between pluralism 
and social unity, self-determination and government control, 
private purpose and public power? 
In a political and cultural setting embedded with the ideol-
ogy of government sponsored schools, private schools in Ameri-
ca have presented a perennial problem to those wishing to 
standardize American children into a more homogeneous group. 
Private schools, on the other hand, have often functioned as a 
social safety valve by providing a way for those with education-
al, religious, or cultural views and values different from the 
majoritarian ideology to find legitimate expression in the edu-
cation of their children. The ability of parents to do so, howev-
er, is determined by the extent of state intervention and regu-
lation. 
Historically, state governments have pursued four major 
strategies in attempting to deal with the private school dilem-
ma. First, many states have elected not to regulate private 
schools or do so in a minimal manner. Second, other states 
have tried to produce superior government schools, hoping to 
entice students in private schools to enroll in public schools, 
thus causing private schools to fold. 8 Third, some states, like 
Oregon, have tried to ban private schools. 9 And fourth, addi-
tional states, such as Ohio (or territories such as Hawaii in 
1927), have attempted to gain control through extensive and 
exhaustive regulations. 10 
B. Legal Overview 
The United States Supreme Court has provided little in 
the way of legal guidelines in defining the proper relationship 
between the state and private schools. In Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters 11the Court struck down an Oregon state statute which 
HARPERS 39-51 (1986); E.G. WEST, EDUCATION AND THE STATE (1965); and DONALD 
A. ERICKSON, SUPER-PARENT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE EDUCATIONAL CONTROLS 
(1973) ERIC, ED 096 770. 
8. This was the perspective of Horace Mann, a prominent advocate of the 
common school movement during the nineteenth-century. CLARENCE KA.RIER, THE 
INDIVIDUAL, SOCIETY, AND EDUCATION 61 (2d ed. 1986). 
9. For example, James Carter and Henry Bernard, early leading figures of 
the common school movement, wanted to abolish private schools. DAVID TYACK, 
TURNING POINTS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION HISTORY 370 (1967); MERLE CURTI, THE 
SOCIAL IDEAS OF AMERICAN EDUCATORS 148-149 (1959). 
10. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); State v. Whisner, 351 
N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976). 
11. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
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required all students to attend public schools. The Pierce case 
established two basic points. First, there would be a fence be-
tween the private and public sphere in education. Private 
schools had a constitutional right to exist, and parents had a 
constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to an 
alternative educational choice besides a school sponsored by the 
state. Second, Pierce, as interpreted in subsequent cases such 
as Wisconsin v. Yoder/2 indicated the general location of the 
fence, namely that the state had the right to regulate private 
schools in a reasonable manner if it chose to do so. Meyer v. 
Nebraska 13 and Farrington v. Tokushige14 specified that the 
fence had to meet some minimal construction requirements. 
The fence was to be at least strong enough to prevent the state 
from crossing over to forbid the teaching of useful knowledge or 
gaining near complete control of private schools through exten-
sive regulations. Since these early cases, the Court has refused 
to hear a number of lower court cases dealing with varying de-
grees of state intervention into private schools. 15 
The crucial questions about the proper relationship be-
tween the state and private schools still remain. The state has 
an important and legitimate interest in ensuring that all chil-
dren receive an adequate education, whether in a state or non-
government institution, is not the question. Two fundamental 
considerations, however, are the extent of that public interest 
and the best way to secure it in a public environment with 
other legitimate and competing interests. In the context of 
public policy concerns, to what degree should the state allow 
for social diversity, and just how different should private edu-
cation be from public education? What limits should the state 
set for pluralistic means and ends in education? How much 
should government restrict the range of alternatives in educa-
tion? The problem is succinctly summarized by Donald 
Erickson: "How can nonpublic education be both responsible 
12. 406 u.s. 205, 213, 233, 236, 239 (1972). 
13. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
14. 273 u.s. 284 (1927). 
15. New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of East Longmeadow, 885 
F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); State v. Patzer, 382 
N.W.2d 631, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986); Johnson v. Charles City Corum. 
Schools Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Preussner v. 
Benton, 474 U.S. 1033 (1985); State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D. 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); State ex rei. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 
N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981). 
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and free? Responsible to serve the public interest; free to exper-
iment and disagree. Without regulation, some schools may 
victimize patrons and endanger the general welfare. With regu-
lation, dissent is jeopardized. Where should the balance be 
struck?"16 
This article proposes a viable policy position defining the 
parameters of appropriate state intervention in the operations 
of a nonpublic school. It argues that a more pluralistic ap-
proach in public policy affecting private schools could better 
reconcile freedom and responsibility than an approach involv-
ing extensive state intervention. 
II. STATE REGULATIONS 
State regulation of private schools limit parental choice in 
education and childrearing. Regulation tends to take away with 
one hand what was given to parents by the other hand of the 
state-the primary responsibility for raising children and di-
recting their education. 17 The procrustean character of regula-
tions and their enforcement often homogenize and standardize 
the educational program for youngsters and parents who have 
diverse educational goals and needs. 18 The wholesale applica-
tion of public school regulations to private schools "is but to 
require that the same hay be fed in the field as is fed in the 
barn."19 To restrict parental choice and discretion in educa-
16. ERICKSON, supra note 2, at 2. 
17. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, (1972). 
18. Several examples illustrate the diverse character of educational needs and 
perspectives. Yoder addresses the distinctive religious and community life of the 
Amish; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In the early 1970's the Santa 
Fe Community School with its nonreligious but distinctive "countercultural" empha-
sis was organized by a small group of parents and teachers; see Santa Fe Commu-
nity Scb. v. New Mexico St. Bd. of Educ., 518 P.2d 272 (N.M. 1974). The Christian 
schools in Kentucky during the late 1970's opposed state regulations requiring 
state-approved teachers and textbooks as determined by the state board of educa-
tion. They felt such teaching and curricular requirements intruded too much on 
their efforts to infuse a particular religious outlook in a child's educational experi-
ence. STEPHEN ARONS in COMPELLING BELIEF-THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOL-
ING 77-86 relates the story of Peter and Susan Perchemlides. In 1977, these par-
ents objected to the "conformity, anti-intellectualism, passivity, alienation, classism, 
and hierarchy" that their children ware being exposed to in the local public school 
in Western Massachusetts. Only after a lengthy confrontation and litigation with 
local public school officials were they able to secure permission to teach their per-
sonal political, cultural and sociological values in the context of their own educa-
tional philosophy. 
19. Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979), cert. de-
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tional practices with unjustified regulations is to harm both the 
child and the parent in significant ways. The seemingly arbi-
trary nature of regulations is antipluralistic, attacks the digni-
ty of parents with children in private schools, intrudes into the 
delicate and sensitive relationship of parent and child, violates 
the parents' sense of moral and religious duty towards their 
children, and calls into question their competence and motiva-
tion without adequate justification.20 In addition, the central-
ized decision making process producing educational regulations 
by individuals far removed from the "front lines" takes on an 
air of unwarranted state paternalism that is foreign to the 
democratic ethos of our society. 
Restriction of personal liberty and institutional autonomy 
through state intervention into private schools also raises seri-
ous and significant questions about its moral justification, its 
legality, and its usefulness in achieving legitimate state ob-
jectives. The current state of our knowledge about education 
and learning casts deep doubts on the ability and competency 
of the state to construct a regulatory algorithm that is not sub-
stantially based on the opinions, personal preferences, and 
speculative ideas of state officials.21 This pervading sense of 
arbitrary restrictions on significant personal decisions and lib-
erty suggests an unethical dimension of significant proportion 
in current policy. The likelihood of infringing on basic constitu-
tional rights such as right of privacy, rights of free exercise of 
religion, freedom of conscience and association along with po-
tential violations of the Establishment Clause through regula-
tory entanglement suggest that the field of private school reg-
ulation is heavily mined with legal explosives. And finally, 
there is simply no way in which the state can know if its regu-
lations are indeed accomplishing legitimate state objectives.22 
Henry Levin summarizes the issues facing the state's effort to 
regulate private schools and concludes that 
nied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980). 
20. E. Vance Randall, Pluralism and Public Policy 293-297 (1989) (disserta-
tion, Cornell University). 
21. E.A. Hanushek, Throwing Money at Schools, 1 J. OF POL'¥ ANALYSIS AND 
MGMT. 19-41 (1981); TYLL VAN GEEL, THE COURT AND AMERICAN EDUCATION LAW 
264 (1987). 
22. For a more extensive discussion and documentation of these points, see E. 
VANCE RANDALL, PUBUC POWER AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS: A CASE FOR PLURALISM (in 
press). 
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[a]t the heart of this view [public benefits of private educa-
tion] is a substantial involvement of the state in private edu-
cation to meet the public interest. Somehow the state must 
assure that at least a minimum set of public outputs are 
produced. Whether this can be done through mandating mini-
mum personnel, curriculum, or output requirements is prob-
lematic. Surely personnel must be competent to impart the 
values and knowledge to produce public benefits efficiently, 
the curriculum must include the subjects and experiences 
that will contribute to this end, and the result must be re-
flected in the outputs of the schools. 
Yet to assure this is so would require an unusual amount 
of regulation, and this would be costly, cumbersome, and 
probably unconstitutional to the degree that the state would 
need to become entangled in religion when evaluating wheth-
er schools meet these regulations. Furthermore, it is not clear 
that many of the public benefits of schooling can be measured 
for purposes of public accountability.23 
In addition, there is little if any evidence that children 
have been harmed by attending private schools.24 This would 
suggest a very reasonable and plausible assertion: that most 
state regulations, at the very least, do not make any positive 
contribution to the child's welfare and may even cause harm to 
parents and children involved in private schools. 
The basic argument advanced by the state for the existence 
of regulations is to protect those children whose parents are 
abusive and/or incompetent. The state claims that some par-
ents who enroll their children in private schools would not 
know whether their children were receiving an adequate educa-
23. Henry M. Levin, Education as a Public and Private Good, 6:4 J. OF PoL 'y 
ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 635 (1987). Although Levin is correct in pointing out the 
great difficulty in evaluating the educational process, he neglects an equally prob-
lematic area-the substantive content of education. What knowledge is of the most 
worth? Which values, attitudes and viewpoints are the "correct" ones? 
24. A typical example would be Sheridan Road Baptist Church v. Dept. of 
Education, 396 N.W.2d 373, 418, n. 54 (Mich. 1986), cert. den., 481 U.S. 1050 
(1987). Results from achievement tests submitted to the court indicated "acceptable 
and, indeed, above average levels of scholastic achievement." In fact, the state 
admitted that "there [was 1 no allegation on [its 1 part that the children were being 
deprived of an education or being miseducated." (ld., at 417, n. 53). For additional 
examples, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 at 534; Iowa Parents Sym-
bols of Defiance on Schools, N. Y. TIMES, March 25, 1987, at A10; Wolman v. 
Essex, 342 F.Supp. 399, 405, aff'd, 409 U.S. 808 (1972), reh'g. denied, 413 U.S. 923 
(1973) and remanded, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 
236, 247-248 (1968); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972). 
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tion or would not care if their children were educated. The 
state also claims that some private school operators are incom-
petent and try to deceive the public. In any of these examples, 
significant harm could be done to the child and unnecessary 
burdens would be imposed on society. This point is very impor-
tant and must be taken seriously. The state has a responsi-
bility to protect children from parental and other private deci-
sions that cause serious injury to the child. 
A great part of the difficulty, however, lies in the fact that 
the state does not know which parents and private schools may 
act in irresponsible ways that cause significant harm to the 
child. The virtue of regulations, then, is their all pervasive 
sweep which anticipates irresponsible acts and attempts to 
prevent injury from occurring. This all inclusive reach of regu-
lations is, paradoxically, both a virtue and vice of regulation 
since this also imposes a very real and staggering cost on the 
great majority of parents with children in private schools and 
private schools who are competent.25 But are there not ways 
in which public policy in education can reduce these costs and 
still provide at least the same level of protection against poten-
tial harm to children? Is there not a way in which "freedom 
and responsibility ... can be united and reconciled to the best 
advantage" of all?26 
III. INTERNAL REGULATORS 
While the state's rationale for issuing regulations carries 
considerable weight, the force of its argument is significantly 
reduced when applied to the private school setting. Several 
self-regulating features inherent in private education accom-
plish most of what state regulations are supposed to do. Fur-
thermore, these internal regulators perform their protective 
function through a natural selection process with little, if any, 
infringement on personal liberty. 
25. "Both centralized decision making and legislated curriculum presume that 
there is 'one best way' to help young people learn. Both presume, too, that those 
farthest removed from the place where the action of teaching and learning take 
place can make better decisions about what should be taught and how improve-
ment can be fostered than those who are closest to the action. Such presumptions 
are at the very least naive and they may actually be dangerous." Jack Frymicr, 
Legislating Centralization, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, May 1986 at 646. See also E.G. 
WEST, EDUCATION AND THE STATE 9 (1965). 
26. CARL L. BECKER, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LIFE 3 (1953). 
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A. Parental Interest 
One of these self-regulating features is that parental choice 
of private education over public education constitutes prima 
facie evidence that they are vitally concerned about their child's 
up bringing and education. The decision not to enroll a child in 
the state school system often comes after careful study and 
reflection. Private education is not the cultural norm. Atten-
dance at a private school is a gesture of dissent from the pre-
dominant public school culture in American society. Also, it 
often requires significant financial and personal sacrifices "in 
face of high taxation, inflation, and sometimes job loss."27 
These significant barriers would be more than sufficient deter-
rents to those few parents who do not care about their 
children's educational development. 
Parents who select private education for their children also 
demonstrate that they know the basics of a quality education. 
They have not only done a comparison between the public and 
private sector but have selected a particular private school. 
This would strongly suggest that they are competent to direct 
the proper education of their children. In a study by Donald 
Erickson comparing preferences of parents in private and pub-
lic schools, the "top-priority reason" given by parents preferring 
private schools was Religion/Spirituality (22% ), followed by 
Academic Quality/Emphasis (20.5%), and Discipline (16.8%). In 
contrast, parents preferring public schools listed their main 
reason as Don't Know (13.6%), followed by Cheapness (13.3%) 
and Proximity, Convenience (12.5%).28 It is little wonder that 
Erickson could suggest that 
parents who actively seek out schools that fit their preference 
are unusually well informed, sophisticated, thoughtful, and 
concerned about their children's schooling. In exercising their 
preferences, these parents sort themselves out into schools 
with different emphases and obtain much greater satisfaction 
than do the parents who do not actively choose. If the ratings 
by these people may be taken seriously, the quality of their 
27. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources, QUALITY OF 
EDUCATION, PART 2, 30, 50 (1983), testimony of William B. Ball. 
28. Donald A. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools: Dynamics o( Supply and 
Demand, PRN ATE EDUCATION: STuDIES IN CHOICE AND PuBLIC PoLICY 93-94 (Dan-
iel C. Levy ed., 1986). It is of interest to note that the "Don't Know" category was 
not selected by any private school parent as a reason for preferring private educa-
tion. 
f 
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children's schooling might have been inferior if the options in 
question had not existed. 29 
B. Parental Investment 
45 
A second way in which the private school choice naturally 
operates against the possibility of educational deprivation for 
private school students is the vested interests of the parents. 
They not only have great concern about the proper development 
of their children, but they also have made significant emotional 
and psychological investments, as well as time and money, in 
the private school choice. Parents have a definite interest in 
seeing that their child does well and they desire to have sub-
stantive involvement in their child's educational progress. In 
doing this they perform the dual function of providing quality 
control and being a source of support. The studies by James 
Coleman and Karl White have suggested that family variables 
account for a good portion of the variance in academic 
achievement. 30 Because of this active involvement by the par-
ents, private school students have a better than average chance 
of receiving a more than adequate education. 
C. Economic Realities 
A third internal regulator is the economics of private edu-
cation. The market for the educational dollar is a tight one. If 
parents cannot find an educational experience superior enough 
to that offered in the public schools, what rational incentive is 
there for them to pay school taxes and private school tuition for 
an inferior or even equivalent educational program? Private 
school operators and potential customers are aware of this. 
"Parents will withdraw their children," notes William Ball, 
"from schools which are poor in quality, or poor in discipline. 
That in fact is why so many parents have removed their chil-
dren from public schools."31 It is not in the best interests of 
private schools to offer shoddy educational programs. If they do 
not satisfy a clientele that is knowledgeable, the students will 
29. Id. at 98. 
30. James S. Coleman et al., Equality of Opportunity Survey (Washington, 
D.C: National Center for Educational Statistics, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1966); Karl R. White, The Relation Between Socioeconomic Status and Academic 
Achievement, 91 PSYCH. BULLJ.TI'IN. 461-181 (1982). 
31. Ball, supra note 27. 
1 
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'be withdrawn and the schools will be forced to close or respond 
to the demands of the parents. Furthermore, private elementa-
ry and secondary schools, unlike private trade or technical 
schools, have a long term interest in the educational career of 
the child. It is to their advantage to provide quality education 
year after year in order to keep students coming back. 
D. Educational Environment 
A fourth intrinsic factor which may prevent any harm from 
occurring to children in private schools is the educational mi-
lieu of the school. This mitigation of educational injury occurs 
in two major ways. First, private schools have the institutional 
autonomy to exercise a greater amount of control over the edu-
cational environment of the school. They have a driving incen-
tive to develop the kind of characteristics found in effective 
schools. These include such things as "clear sense of purpose, 
an institutional ethos, [and] team spirit,"32 along with "curric-
ular goals, high expectations for students, dedicated teachers, 
effective discipline ... strong emphasis on academic sub-
jects,"33 "strong educational leadership,"34 a shared "belief 
structure, a value system, a consensual rather than hierarchal 
governance system, and a set of common goals that blur the 
boundaries between ... private and organizational lives" of the 
school community.35 This has led several researchers to sug-
gest that the difference in achievement found in the Coleman, 
Kilgore, and Hoffer study between public and private school 
students might be partially explained by the relative latitude 
private schools have to construct and customize an educational 
environment conducive to excellent education.36 
32. Jack Frymier, Legislating Centralization, PHI DELTA KAPPAN 648 (1986). 
33. DENIS P. DOYLE & TERRY W. HARTLE, EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION: THE 
STATES TAKE CHARGE 52 (1985). 
34. John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and the Organization 
of Schools, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Sci· 
ence Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 28 August-! September, 1985, (ERIC, 
ED 263674, 5). 
35. Chester Finn as quoted in DOYLE, supra note 33. See also Willis J. 
Furtwengler Implementing Strategies for a School Effectiveness Program, PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN, December 1985) at 265; Gerald Grant, The Character of Education and 
the Education of Character, 18 AMERICAN EDUCATION 37-46 (1982). 
36. John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and the Organization 
of Schools, ERIC (ED 263674). See also John E. Chubb, Why the Current Wave of 
School Reform Will Fail, 90 THE PuBLIC INTEREST 28-49 (1988). 
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Another means by which the private school environment 
reduces the possibility of a student receiving an inferior educa-
tion is the influence of his classmates. Richard Murnane con-
tends that private school students have higher achievement 
scores than public school students in part because more capable 
students attend private schools than public schools.37 Having 
such "fellow students," states Murnane, "plays a significant 
contributing role in determining student scores."38 Cookson 
and Persell report that the susceptibility of youth to peer pres-
sure "can have an impact on even an indifferent student" sur-
rounded by classmates "who are academically interested and 
ambitious." As one student observed, "It isn't cool to be dumb 
around here."39 
Thus the private school environment, both in terms of 
institutional culture and the students who comprise the 
student body, functions as an additional intrinsic governor 
greatly moderating the possibility of a child receiving an inade-
quate education. 
IV. EXTERNAL REGULATORS 
A. Justification for Regulation of Private Schools 
The available evidence from court cases and research on 
private schools suggests that concerned and competent parents 
do try very hard to ensure that their children are receiving a 
good education in the private sector.40 But parents and pri-
vate school personnel are not infallible. There is the remote 
possibility that parental interest and the internal regulatory 
features inherent in private education will not be sufficient in 
every instance to protect the interests of the child. What should 
37. Richard Murnane, Comparisons of Private and Public Schools: The Critical 
Role of Regulations, PRIVATE EDUCATION: STUDIES IN CHOICE AND POLICY 138, 144 
(Donald C. Levy, ed. 1986). 
38. ld. at 138-152. See also Richard Murnane, Comparisons of Private and 
Public Schools: What Can We Learn?, PRIVATE EDUCATION: STUDIES IN CHOICE AND 
POLICY 138-152, 153-169 (Donald C. Levy ed. 1986); Richard Murnane, The Uncer-
tain Consequences of Tuition Tax Credits: An Analysis of Student Achievement and 
Economic Incentives, and J. Douglas Willms, Do Private Schools Produce Higher 
Levels of Academic Achievement? New Evidence for the Tuition Tax Credit Debate?, 
PuBLIC DOLLARS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS 210-222, 223-231 (Thomas James & Henry 
Levin eds., 1983). 
39. As quoted in PETER W. COOKSON, JR., & CAROLINE HODGES PERSELL, 
PREPARING FOR POWER: AMERICA'S ELITE BOARDING SCHOOLS 95 (1985). 
40. Tyack, supra note 6. 
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be done in these rare cases? The use of regulations still re-
mains attractive to the state, but perhaps more for reasons of 
administrative ease and convenience for the state's educational 
bureaucracy than in providing demonstrable benefits to the 
child. What approach can replace the indiscriminate effects of 
the regulatory cannon with the focused impact of a narrowly 
defined policy? What would be the most effective types of exter-
nal regulators? 
One approach to answering these important questions is to 
look at all the state regulations governing private schools and 
begin to select those which appear to be essential for protecting 
the basic liberty rights of children. This approach has some 
merit but is exceedingly burdensome and complex, somewhat 
analogous to searching for four-leaf clovers in a football field. 
One must first gather all of the pertinent regulations, then sort 
through them and by some predetermined criteria select the 
ones that appear to be essential. One potential flaw in this 
approach is the assumption that the current body of private 
school regulations contains all of the essential regulations. 
A more effective approach is to rephrase the question in 
terms of identifying those things which would definitely prevent 
a child from receiving a basic education rather than trying to 
identify all of the contributing ingredients of a basic education. 
These "failure factors" would be proper areas for state regula-
tion. 
B. Appropriate Areas for State Regulation-Failure Factors 
The first and most obvious way in which a child can fail to 
be properly educated is through loss of life or physical well-
being. Regulations such as fire, safety, health, and building 
codes which work to ensure a safe and secure learning environ-
ment are essential. Along these same lines would be important 
regulations prohibiting the physical, emotional, spiritual, and 
sexual abuse of children. The protection of children from physi-
cal harm and danger is fundamental to the exercise of personal 
liberty and is a critical area for state supervision in private as 
well as public schools. 
Secondly, to ensure that all children have an opportunity 
to learn and grow in fundamental and essential ways, the state 
has a duty to require that such an opportunity be provided 
through compulsory education laws. Reports and reporting 
procedures necessary to account for every single eligible child 
in the state would be a proper action on the part of the state. 
L 
35] PRIVATE SCHOOLS, PUBLIC POLICY 49 
Each private school should be required to notify the state of its 
existence through some scheme of registration. They should 
also report the names, addresses, and parents or guardians of 
those students who have enrolled and those who withdraw. 
A third major way in which a child's educational experi-
ence could be seriously compromised is through parental igno-
rance. In private education this could happen in two ways. 
First, the private school could attempt to defraud parents with 
false and misleading information about the school and the 
progress of their children. Second, vital information that a 
parent would need to assess the quality of the education offered 
by the school and to find the right "fit" between various edu-
cational programs and the particular needs of their children 
may not be available. In addition to prohibiting unethical busi-
ness practices such as "fraud, embezzlement, [and] false solici-
tation,"41 private schools should be required to meet some type 
of truth-in-education disclosure standards. These could include 
information on such areas as admission requirements,42 
financial statements; physical facilities; staff, including their 
education and experience; curriculum requirements for gradu-
ation; present students and numbers that have failed or 
dropped out; average and median scores of students on stan-
dardized aptitude and achievement tests; academic placement 
and performance of students after graduation; statement of 
the school's basic philosophy and methodology of education,43 
and policies relating to the internal workings of the school such 
as discipline, grading, extracurricular activities, liability insur-
ance, tuition, and other program costs.44 This type of informa-
tion would greatly increase the effectiveness and competency of 
parents in meeting the basic educational needs of their chil-
dren.45 This area, however, must be approached in a parsi-
monious fashion or extensive requirements could violate the 
41. Ball, supra note 27, at 51. 
42. John E. Coons, The Voucher Alternative, 9 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC STUDIES Spring 1984 at 97. 
43. John Elson, Legal Dimensions of the State Regulation of Nonpublic 
Schools, SUPER PARENT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE EDUCATIONAL CONTROLS 4/57 (Don-
ald A. Erickson ed. 1973, ERIC ED 096770). 
44. For some examples of what has been done in some states already, see 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. Sec. 394.241 (1985); 6 N.J. ADM. CODE 34-1.5 (1968); 16 
VER. STAT. ANN. 165a (Supp. 1985). 
45. A logical extension of this point would be to require the same amount of 
information to be disclosed by public schools as well. 
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Establishment Clause forbidding excessive entanglement by the 
government in religious institutions.46 
A fourth and final situation in which the basic liberty in-
terests of children could be violated in a fundamental way is by 
the deprivation of basic literacy skills. The ability to read, write 
and perform basic computational skills is the universal founda-
tion upon which all other learning is built.47 The state would 
be fully justified in mandating that any educational program 
enrolling children of compulsory education age be required to 
equip each child with these basic literacy and mathematical 
skills. (This assumes, of course, that the child has the capacity 
to learn and is not learning disabled.) 
These four areas represent universal ways in which a child 
would fail to gain an education essential to his personal devel-
opment and the security of our democratic society. They qualify 
as essential areas of state intervention and fall within the 
realm of justified state regulation. 
C. Standards of Judicial Review 
The specific form and content of regulations that the state 
may develop in these four essential areas-ensuring a safe and 
secure learning environment, universal formal education, ethi-
cal business practices and truth-in-education, and basic literacy 
topics of reading, writing and arithmetic-are not self-evident. 
This leaves open the very real possibility of the state issuing 
regulations "under the guise of protecting the public interest by 
legislative action which is arbitrary or without some reasonable 
relation" to these four key objectives in educational policy.48 A 
fundamental principle in our liberal democratic society is that 
the state is obligated to justify limitations placed on liberty.49 
Justified intervention includes both legitimate objectives and 
legal means. 50 There are both substantive and procedural 
grounds (fundamental rights and hearing rights) that the state 
must meet before it can legally restrict personal liberty.51 
46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
47. The Supreme Court defined "basic education" as comprising the basic lit-
eracy skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 
213 and 225-226. 
48. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 400. 
49. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
50. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
51. See, e.g. fundamental rights, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
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Even in the important areas of health, safety, fire and building 
code regulations, state regulations could be constructed and 
enforced in an arbitrary manner, and may pose formidable 
obstacles to parental choice in education through 
"hypertechnical" codes. 52 
If attempts to modify legislation or use administrative 
hearings do not provide a satisfactory resolution of state inter-
vention, the only recourse available to parents and private 
schools is litigation. The standard of judicial review that the 
court selects in adjudicating disputes over the constitutionality 
of legislation and state action is critical to the outcome of the 
case. If the rational-means test is used, then the chance of 
parents and private schools prevailing is next to nothing be-
cause state action is considered presumptively rational and 
thus constitutional until proven otherwise.53 The usefulness of 
this test would only be found in cases where there was an out-
rageously clear and blatant invasion of liberty rights such as 
the banning of the private school option. Yet the other common 
standard of review, the strict scrutiny test, 54 may impose over-
ly harsh and rigid restraints on the state to act in critical areas 
of obvious importance such as health and safety. There has 
been emerging in recent times, however, the creation and use 
of a judicial standard of review that stands between the ratio-
nal means test and the strict scrutiny test that has great po-
tential value in protecting the important interests of both the 
state and the private educational sector. 
1. Intermediate standard of review 
The developing third standard of review has been used by 
the Supreme Court to scrutinize legislation under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where certain 
609 (1984); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See, e.g. hearing rights, 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
52. City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 639 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1982). 
Also, Erickson reported that the fundamentalist Christian school in Peshkin's study 
was unduly harassed "by public authorities through capricious application of health 
and safety codes, Erickson, supra note 28, at 92. 
53. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); New Or· 
leans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
54. !d. See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), reh'g. denied 458 U.S. 
1131; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Reh'g. 
denied 411 U.S. 959. 
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suspect classifications did not warrant strict scrutiny review.55 
A major function of the Equal Protection Clause is to "operate 
as an anti-majoritarian safeguard which views with suspicion 
all public actions tending to burden 'discrete and insular' 
minorities."56 
The selection of the intermediate standard usually occurs 
when "important, though not necessarily 'fundamental' or 'pre-
ferred,' interests are at stake ... [where there has been] either 
a significant interference with liberty or a denial of a benefit 
vital to an individual."57 This "heightened standard of review," 
"intermediate standard of review," or '"second order' rational-
basis review"58 has been applied directly by the Court to cases 
touching on classifications based on gender;59 legitimacy;60 or 
children of illegal aliens.61 These areas are "beyond individual 
control and bear no relation to the individual's ability to partic-
ipate in and contribute to society."62 
The application of this third standard by the Supreme 
Court to important but not necessarily fundamental rights such 
as parental choice in private education is worthy of consider-
ation. First, there are some good indications that, because pri-
vate school regulations affect a particular minority group in 
some important ways, a higher standard of review should be 
required. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court 
wondered whether 
55. Seone v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981). 
56. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1077 (1978). 
57. !d. at 1089, 1090. Admittedly the exact nature and boundaries of this 
intermediate standard and the other two are far from clear. Archibald Cox crit-
ically observes that 
[i]n the middle ground confusion reigns. The original doctrinal purity of 
the 'strict scrutiny-compelling public purpose' and 'minimum rationality' 
tests has yielded to three formulations. All three have surrendered even 
the pretense of precision . . . . 
The net effect in the middle ground has been ten or twelve years of 
highly particularistic decisions resulting from shifting alliances among the 
Justices. 
ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 321 (1987). 
58. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 453, 458 (1985). 
59. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g. denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977). 
60. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
61. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), reh'g. denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). 
62. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., at 440 (1985). The categories of 
"race, national origin, or alien status" are considered as suspect classifications and 
require the strict scrutiny test. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1060. 
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legislation which restricts those political processes ... is to be 
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most 
other types of legislation ... [and] whether similar consider-
ations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular 
religious, Pierce u. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or nation-
al, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 
404; Farrington u. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, or racial minori-
ties, Nixon u. Herndon, supra; Nixon u. Condon, supra; wheth-
er prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly 
more searching judicial inquiry.63 
53 
It is important to note that many of the Court cases re-
ferred to in this famous footnote in the Carotene decision were 
landmark cases involving the state and private schools. They 
were examples selected by the Court of normal political pro-
cesses not offering sufficient protection for a minority group 
from majoritarian or state government domination.64 The his-
tory of private schools and the state is a rocky one with preju-
dicial attempts by the government to eliminate their presence 
through prohibition or through excessive regulation. The fact 
that it required three Supreme Court decisions (Meyer, Pierce, 
and Farrington) to insure the private school option attests to 
the fact that the customary political processes have often not 
been very effectual in protecting their interests. Laurence Tribe 
sees the Meyer and Pierce cases as 
demonstrat[ing] judicial solicitude for the Catholics in Oregon 
and the Germans in Nebraska against whom the invalidated 
statutes had evidently been directed because of the inability 
of those groups to adequately safeguard their interests 
through the political processes of their states.65 
63. 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938). 
64, "History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of per· 
sonal liberty by the state which have not been justified, as they are here, in the 
name of righteousness and the public good, and few which have not been directed, 
as they are now, at politically helpless minorities," Minersville District v. Gobitis, 
310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940), (Stone, J., dissenting). 
65. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1320. 
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In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,66 the Court declared that wealth was not a "suspect 
class" and did not have any of the traditional "indicia of 
suspectness: ... [such as] a position of political powerlessness 
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process."67 In noting the similarities in language be-
tween the Carotene footnote and the Rodriguez case, "[sh]ould 
'political powerlessness' alone," queries Gunther, "justify a 
conclusion of 'suspectness'?"68 
Parents do suffer a loss of parental liberty to direct the 
education of their children when educational choices are re-
stricted by private school regulations. The benefits of providing 
a more suitable education to their children from their perspec-
tive, and doing so in a manner which is compatible with their 
conscience and personal beliefs, are important and significant. 
They are the same benefits which public school parents enjoy. 
The denial of these liberties imposes substantial burdens on 
parents in their efforts to rear their children and invades the 
intimate and private sphere of family life. 
Many parents with children in private education claim that 
state regulations infringe on their religious beliefs and dimin-
ish their right to privacy in raising their children according to 
their conscience. These kinds of assertions begin to touch on 
areas of fundamental, constitutionally-protected rights. This 
raises another interesting question in terms of judicial review: 
what would prevent the Court from using the intermediate 
standard of review under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment for cases that may hover near the periph-
ery of these fundamental, substantive rights? 
All of this suggests that the idea of requiring a "more 
searching inquiry" into state efforts to regulate private schools 
has currency and must be taken seriously. This article con-
tends that such should indeed be the case. All state regulations 
governing private schools should be subjected to a "more exact-
ing judicial inquiry," at least at the intermediate level of re-
view. This will offer a more balanced protection of the personal 
liberty rights of parents, private school personnel, and of the 
66. 411 u.s. 1 (1973). 
67. ld. at 28. 
68. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 657, 
n.l (12th ed. 1991). 
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state. It would also contribute to the pluralistic character of our 
society and strengthen our democracy. 
Tribe describes six ways in which the intermediate stan-
dard of review has been used to offer a more substantial protec-
tion of liberty interests.69 First, it requires that legislation be 
evaluated as to its degree of importance. Second, it requires 
that there be a fairly close connection or fit between the objec-
tive of the legislation and the means selected to achieve it.70 
Third, the judge needs to look at the case from the viewpoint of 
the aggrieved party.71 Fourth, it asks that a "current articula-
tion" or rationale be given by the state for the regulation.72 
The regulation must fulfill a contemporary purpose as given by 
the state. Fifth, principles must precede programs. Regulations 
should flow from a rationale. The rationale or justification for 
the regulations cannot be given in hindsight.73 And sixth, it 
requires the opportunity for rebuttal. 74 The state must allow 
for exceptions to the regulation if the offended party can dem-
onstrate sufficient reasons to be exempt. 
These six suggested techniques for establishing the validity 
for all private school regulation do not seem overly burdensome 
or restrictive to the state. The intermediate standard of review 
would require that the state exercise much more care and pre-
cision in drafting regulations, which in turn would help reduce 
the potential for capricious legislation and/or arbitrary enforce-
ment. It would also provide a more equitable forum where 
parents and private schools could contest offensive legislation 
without having to subject them and the state to the much more 
inflexible, demanding and difficult strict scrutiny/compelling 
interest standard. The use of the intermediate standard of re-
view puts "teeth" into what the state is always required to 
do-justify its restriction on personal liberties. It is more sensi-
tive to those who have a justifiable reason to be exempt from 
the regulation. To the degree that restrictions on personal 
liberty are placed on those who actually deserve it, they become 
more ethical, constitutional, and effective expressions of public 
policy. 
69. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 1601-1610. 
70. !d. 
71. !d. 
72. !d. 
73. !d. 
74. !d. 
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2. Strict scrutiny 
Some might contend that the above criteria for state super-
vision of private schools is far too conservative and should be 
enlarged to include the mandatory instruction in a "common 
core" of knowledge. The idea of a common core has much intu-
itive appeal. 75 Every child should not only learn the basic lit-
eracy and math skills but should also leam important facts 
about the world, our culture and way of life. An interesting as-
pect, however, about the "common core" argument is that the 
common knowledge that should be held in common by all is not 
commonly known or self-evident. Erickson points out that the 
educational desiderata of this type can be listed almost indefi-
nitely, far beyond the bounds of student time in the high 
school and even the undergraduate college. We are forced, 
then, to confront questions pondered for generations by propo-
nents of liberal education: What knowledge is of the most 
worth? What knowledge is utterly essential? ... But if we 
cannot identify what everyone must master, by what warrant 
do we specify what everyone must undergo?76 
But a much larger problem than agreement on general 
topics or categories is defining the substantive details of the 
common core. 77 Which "ideas, values, [and] political views" are 
to be selected and how will they be taught? A crucial problem 
with expanding beyond the basic literacy skills is the entrance 
into dangerous terrain filled with preferences, opinions, values, 
personal beliefs, and worldviews. This is a very problematic 
area because it deals with the content of educational experience 
upon which there is not much agreement and, yet, it is pro-
posed that what is decided be imposed upon all children by the 
police power of the state. This rather arbitrary action simply 
75. Some even question the notion of the need for a common core of educa-
tional experience, at least in the sense of common values. David Nichols suggests 
that the "idea that a state can exist only when the people share a common set of 
values is mistaken. Even in a relatively homogeneous state like the United 
Kingdom, values differ quite radically from one section of the population to anoth-
er." What a society needs is "a majority of the people ... shar[ing] a belief in the 
importance of civil peace, combined with a willingness to allow their fellow citizens 
to live life as they choose to live it. They must also recognize some machinery 
which is the normal channel for resolving disputes." DAVID NICHOLS, THE 
PLURAUST STATE 122-123 (1975). 
76. ERICKSON, supra note 2 at 217, 219. 
77. For some interesting work in this area, see E.D. HIRSCH, JR. ET AL., THE 
DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (1988). 
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creates an "unmanageable conflict over matters of con-
science"78 in government socialization of all children. 
If the state feels strongly about specifying and mandating 
a common core of knowledge for all children in both public and 
private schools, it should prove that such regulatory action is 
constitutional. This burden of proof should be that required by 
the strict scrutiny standard because the fundamental right to 
privacy, parental rights, and those rights protected by the First 
Amendment require such a standard and would be ideal com-
ponents to form a "hybrid" case as required for all Free Exer-
cise claims. 79 The government must give evidence of a compel-
ling state interest and allow a least restrictive alternative if it 
wants to impose requirements extending beyond the four basic 
areas of proper state intervention previously outlined. Stephen 
Arons contends that 
[i]mposing this well-established constitutional standard on 
government bodies that attempt to regulate the essentially 
private function of education would eliminate upwards of 95 
percent of the conflicts over schooling reported here. 80 
The important issue of identifying factors leading to failure 
rather than all those contributing to educational success needs 
to be addressed in evaluating the common core argument and 
other proposals for extending the arm of the state into private 
school functions. For example, will a child fail to become a good 
citizen and contribute to the economy if private education does 
not teach a common core of knowledge above and beyond basic 
literacy skills? It is not entirely obvious this would be the case. 
With these basic literacy skills, students could conceivably 
manage to acquire whatever "common core" they need to have. 
In addition, the probability of a viable private school offering 
only instruction in basic literacy skills seems quite improbable 
and not supported by available evidence.81 
78. STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELUNG BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN 
SCHOOLING 209 (1983). 
79. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 
reh'g. denied 496 U.S. 913. 
80. ARONS, supra note 77 at 213. See also Neal Devins, State Regulations of 
Christian Schools, 10 J. OF LEG. 351-381 (Summer 1983); Wendell R. Bird, Free-
dom From Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School Instruction, 2 HARV. J. 
OF L. AND PuB.POL 'v. 125-205 (Summer 1979); Robert M. Gordon, Freedom of Ex-
pression and Values Inculcation in the Public School Curriculum, 13 J. OF L. AND 
EDUC. 523-579 (October 1984); and TYLL VAN GEEL, AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THE 
SCHOOL PROGRAM 167 (1976). 
81. For example, the school Alan Peshkin studied was located in a state with 
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3. Perspective 
Finally, it is crucial in any discussion of state controls for 
private schools to keep in mind that a violation of these regula-
tions has been considered a criminal offense with fines and/or 
jail sentences attached. Children attending unapproved private 
schools have been declared as neglected children and removed 
from their homes by the state. One way to help keep this im-
portant perspective when deciding which private school activi-
ties should be regulated by the state is to pose this question: If 
a private school refused to comply with a proposed require-
ment, would the lack of compliance be of such a nature as to 
justify the closing of a private school? If parents enroll their 
children in a private school not in full compliance with certain 
state regulations, is that noncompliance of such a magnitude as 
to justify the removal of the children from their homes and 
parents? Is the nature of the penalty proportional to the size of 
the offense or the potential harm that may result?82 
V. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE STATE 
What is proposed here, then, is not total withdrawal or 
abdication of the state from the supervision of private schools. 
Through the judicious use of external regulators such as state 
regulation only in the four essential areas (safe environment, 
compulsory education, unethical practices, and basic literacy 
skills), the state can and should play a fundamental role in 
no regulations specifying curricular topics. Its curriculum offering was, therefore, 
voluntary and included such courses as English, science, band, math, religious 
education, physical education, geography, choir, U.S. history, world history, 
journalism, physical science, algebra, functional math, biology, speech, driver educa-
tion, industrial arts, drafting, typing, health, drama, office practice, Spanish, phys· 
ics, government, and economics. ALAN PESHKIN, GoD'S CHOICE - THE TOTAL WORLD 
OF A FuNDAMENTALIS'l' CHRISTIAN SCHOOL 301-302 (1986). 
It should be noted, however, the this particular private religious school, in con-
trast to many other private schools, was fmancially well off and could afford to 
offer a substantial curriculum. This illustrates a dilemma facing many private 
schools which is beyond their control. State policy may require a substantial curric-
ulum be offered at a private school but the financial resources to pay for such 
programs are limited by current public funding policies for private education. The 
private school is simultaneously pushed in one direction and pulled in another by 
the state. It is required to meet state-imposed mandates, but the private school is 
not given the resources to meet the requirements. 
82. It is interesting to note the different treatment accorded those in the 
public school sector. If a child fails in a public school, are the parents charged 
with neglect? If uncertified teachers teach in public schools, are those schools 
closed? 
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protecting the liberty interests of the child and the parent. 
Conflict and disagreement can be minimized if areas of state 
regulation are limited to those where there is near universal 
agreement. Conflict can also be reduced by pursuing policies 
that broaden the regulatory menu and allow for more choices. 
This includes such things as giving private schools the option of 
either having a certified teacher or teaching a required curricu-
lum, of choosing between input items such as teacher qualifica-
tions or curriculum requirements versus output factors such as 
taking standardized tests, of being allowed to seek approval by 
the state or approval by a private accrediting agency. All of 
these are ways in which liberty can be maximized and harm 
minimized. Regulatory emphasis on ends instead of prescribing 
the means also allows a much greater breadth for the exercise 
of responsible choice and the preservation of personal liberties. 
There are other ways in which the state can be a positive 
influence in improving private education and protecting the 
liberty interests of the child. It can provide information, recom-
mendations, and research results on educational issues and 
programs to private schools. Private school personnel could be 
invited to attend inservice workshops sponsored by the state 
for its teachers. Four states-New York, Florida, Louisiana, 
and Ohio-have established state advisory boards with state 
and private school officials where they can work together on 
matters of mutual concern.83 There is great potential value for 
the education of children and our society in transforming the 
usual adversarial relationship between the state and private 
schools and parents into one of mutual respect and coopera-
tion.84 
Another area of great importance is the development of 
alternative approaches to litigation in resolving disputes be-
tween the state and private schools such as arbitration under 
the auspices of neutral third parties, the full utilization of 
administrative hearings, and continued efforts to modify offend-
ing legislation. The costs of litigation for parents and private 
schools presents a formidable obstacle in their efforts to pursue 
83. Phyllis L. Blaunstein, Public and Nonpublic Schools: Finding Ways to 
Work Together, Pm DELTA KAPPAN, January 1986, at 368-372. 
84. DAVID S. SEELEY, Education Through Partnership (1985). 
Donald Erickson states that the "best safeguard against harmful governmental 
interference in nonpublic school affairs is ... not reliance on either substantive or 
procedural legal rights, but on a constructive and cooperative approach towards the 
settlement of differences." Erickson, supra note 2, at 4/50. 
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and obtain judicial relief from state encroachment. The 
Whisner case, for example, cost the small church school over 
$30,000 in legal fees. 85 The state, on the other hand, has al-
most limitless resources because it is able to extemalize its 
costs upon the taxpayers. This raises questions of equity. 
To safeguard against the natural tendency of petty despo-
tism, all state regulations must at least pass an "intermediate 
standard of review." A "strict scrutiny" review should be re-
quired for all regulations touching on the actual content and 
process of the educational program, e.g. required courses, text-
books, specific teacher qualifications, etc. The state must show 
a substantial means-end relationship between the specific man-
ner in which it wants to limit the liberty of private schools and 
parents and a legitimate state objective. This requires the state 
to do what is required of parents and private schools-act in a 
responsible, justifiable manner with its prerogatives and au-
thority. The Supreme Court has stated that 
[t]he statist notion that governmental power should supersede 
parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse 
and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition . 
. . Simply because the decision of a parent is not agree-
able to a child or because it involves risks does not automati-
cally transfer the power to make that decision from the par-
ents to some agency or officer of the state.86 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article began with a chilling and sobering account of 
the closure by the state of two private schools. These events 
raised several key questions about the general role of the state 
in society and its proper relationship to private elementary and 
secondary schools. What should be the appropriate public policy 
towards private schools? What legitimate interests does the 
state possess that would justify govemment intervention into 
private schools? Which private school affairs should be regulat-
ed and controlled by the govemment? 
85. James C. Carper, The Whisner Decision: A Case Study in the State Regu-
lation of Christian Day Schools, JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE, Spring 1982, at 
295, n. 49. 
86. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). See also the Court's rejection 
of the state as a Platonic guardian of the child by removing the parents from any 
parental role. This would result in "doing violence to both the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-402 (1923). 
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The dilemma comes into full focus when the fundamental 
and important interests of the state are juxtaposed with those 
of the parents and sponsors of private schools. How can the 
state be sure that parents and private schools are protecting 
the vital interests of the child and society in a private educa-
tional setting? What is the proper mix of responsibility and 
freedom? What guarantee is there that private schools can act 
in a responsible manner and yet retain their institutional 
uniqueness? Where is the point at which government is able to 
protect its legitimate interests and yet leave the private educa-
tion option with sufficient internal integrity to remain a real 
choice, a refuge for cultural, religious, and educational dissent-
ers? 
The indeterminate nature of education and the ambiguity 
of educational and social goals preclude the state's ability to 
pinpoint with any practical accuracy where the interests of the 
state end and those of the private school begin. The magnitude 
of the imprecision is sufficiently large to preclude any attempts 
to fine tune regulations to avoid potential pitfalls and dangers. 
These pitfalls and dangers are of such importance that they 
require the state to exercise a very cautious and conservative 
approach toward any kind of control over private schools. The 
only appropriate alternative is to embrace and protect a more 
structural and substantive pluralism in American education. A 
public policy in education grounded on essentials, yet heavily 
imbued with pluralism, can escape many of the problems and 
difficulties created by state intervention and yet be able to 
adequately address the basic concerns raised by both sides. 
A more pluralistic approach in public policy affecting pri-
vate schools is not only required but could more effectively 
reconcile freedom and responsibility to the best advantage of 
everyone than an approach involving extensive state interven-
tion. Important internal regulators such as parental interest 
and investment, economic realities of the educational market 
place, and a unique educational environment are significant 
factors which would prevent harm from occurring to a child. 
These internal, self-regulating features of private education are 
legitimately supplemented with a minimal amount of external 
regulation. State regulations mandating a safe and secure 
learning environment, universal formal education, ethical busi-
ness practices, and curriculum requirements in basic literacy 
act as a safety net to insure that children attending private 
schools will receive an education meeting the essential inter-
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ests of the state and satisfying the liberty interests of parents 
and private schools. 
An educational policy based on pluralism with its emphasis 
on the maximization of liberty, the decentralization of decision 
making, and the recognition of private groups, is, admittedly, 
neither risk free nor perfect.87 But the current regulatory ap-
proach used by those states involving substantial intervention 
into private schools (or the massive regulation of public schools 
for that matter) is no better. 
The pluralistic approach advocated by this paper suggests 
a superior means to maximize choice for parents and private 
schools and still provide reasonable assurances to protect the 
liberty interests of children.88 It would enrich American edu-
cation, resolve much of the current conflict between the state 
and private schools, and present a feasible solution to preserv-
ing both freedom and responsibility in our society. 
87. Robert Dahl reminds us that "to say that a solution has disadvantages is 
never a good reason for preferring the worse to the better." ROBERT DAHL, DILEM-
MAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 107 (1982). 
88. James J. Kilpatrick notes that "occasional abuses are part of the price we 
willingly pay for freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom of mind to seek 
the truth and happiness in individual ways. The benefits of diversity far exceed 
the supposed advantages of uniformity." James J. Kilpatrick, Kentucky Court Deci-
sion Hailed, THE DAILY TIMES, November 18, 1979, at 4a. 
